Has EMU Had Any Impact on the Degree of Wage Restraint? by Adam S. Posen & Daniel Popov Gould
Working Paper S e r i e s
W P   0 6 - 6                                                                                                                                                                                                           A U G U S T   2 0 0 6   
1 7 5 0   M a s s a c h u s e t t s   a v e n u e ,   n W   |   W a s h i n g t o n ,   D c   2 0 0 3 6 - 1 9 0 3
t e l :   ( 2 0 2 )   3 2 8 - 9 0 0 0   |   F a x :   ( 2 0 2 )   6 5 9 - 3 2 2 5   |   W W W . i i e . c o M
Has EMU Had Any Impact on the Degree 
of Wage Restraint?
Adam S. Posen and Daniel Popov Gould
Abstract
This working paper investigates the European Monetary Unification’s (EMU) effect on wage restraint—the degree to which 
wage increases do or do not exceed productivity growth. We find in cross-sectional investigations that wage restraint either 
is unchanged or has increased following EMU in the vast majority of countries. This finding contradicts the predictions of a 
widely cited family of models of coordination of labor market bargaining. In particular, one would have expected Germany 
to display the greatest decline in wage restraint post-EMU under these models, but in our time-series analysis we find no 
indication of such a decline. The overall shift toward greater wage restraint is consistent with the models that emphasize 
the gains from monetary credibility. The time-series evidence on Italy, which shows a significant increase in wage restraint 
after eurozone entry, also supports this view. That said, the increase in wage restraint in the eurozone is matched by that 
associated with the increase in credibility seen in the United Kingdom and Sweden after their adoption of inflation targeting 
post-1992. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Lucas Critique notwithstanding, applied economic research has paid a great deal of attention in 
recent decades to the potential for changes in monetary regimes to induce lasting changes in economic 
structures and behavior.1 In particular, given the key role of inflation expectations in wage setting and the 
presumed endogeneity of practices such as indexation to the price environment, theorists have developed 
increasingly sophisticated models of the interaction between central banks and labor market institutions.2 
  The creation of the euro presents a natural opportunity to investigate these models’ predic-
tions. Eurozone member countries’ economies, where wage bargaining institutions and practices varied 
substantially, suddenly underwent a simultaneous shift in monetary regime to the European System of 
Central Banks (ESCB) and the Eurosystem. This shift would not necessarily have had the same effect on 
all eurozone economies—the pre-existing extent of unionization, degree of centralization and coordina-
tion in wage bargaining, relative size of the economy in the monetary union, and so on could condition a 
given economy’s response. Given this conditionality, theorists were generally building upon the insights 
of Calmfors and Driffill’s (1988) seminal paper on the interaction between centralization of wage bargain-
ing and macroeconomic performance.4 Interestingly, there was little agreement between the predictions of 
European theorists and policymakers. Labor economists and political scientists whose approach worked 
from wage bargaining institutions upward to macroeconomic outcomes tended to emphasize the risks to 
macroeconomic performance from European Monetary Unification (EMU) causing a mismatch between 
institutions, which might result in suboptimal coordination. On the other hand, almost all eurozone 
macroeconomists and central bankers felt that short-run inflation and output volatility would generally 
improve with the monetary regime shift, and many went further, suggesting that more credible policy 
would percolate downward and induce structural reform in labor markets.5
  Two difficulties have limited the success of empirical inquiries into this issue. The first, well-rec-
ognized, difficulty is that the number of country observations available to investigators is limited, and so 
1.  Lucas (1976) famously argued that known and lasting changes in economic policy would lead to offsetting private behavior 
such that policy changes would make little or no difference to economic outcomes.
2.  See, among others, Bean (1998), Bayoumi and Sgherri (2004), Calmfors (1998), Cukierman and Lippi (1999, 2001), Duval 
and Elmeskov (2005), Gruener and Hefeker (1999), Hall and Franzese (1998), Iversen and Soskice (1998, 2000), Saint-Paul and 
Bentolila (2000), and Sibert and Sutherland (2000).
.  Calmfors (2001) and Cukierman and Lippi (2001) give useful albeit partial surveys of the factors involved.
4.  These authors acknowledge their debt in turn to Olson (1982), who first outlined why the behavior of interest groups depends 
upon how “encompassing” their membership is.
5.  Posen (1998a, 1999) expressed an early American skepticism on both these counts. Duval and Elmeskov (2005) and Posen 
(2005) both give references to statements by euro proponents pre-EMU that the euro would strongly induce if not force struc-
tural change.Page 
therefore is the degree of freedom to distinguish robustly among competing hypotheses.6 The second diffi-
culty is that the vast majority of empirical studies tend to focus on aggregate macroeconomic outcomes—
normally inflation and/or unemployment—even though the underlying theory usually generates hypoth-
eses about real wage determination.7 The first difficulty is largely unavoidable, though with time and with 
different cuts at the problem, some clarity may be achieved. The second difficulty, however, is unnecessary 
and may in fact exacerbate the first problem. If the competing theories have different implications for 
real wages or functions thereof, it may be possible to distinguish between them by looking directly at the 
predictions for those variables and thus not burn degrees of freedom (and confuse the matter) by trying to 
control for shocks to inflation or unemployment or country-specific effects with respect to those variables.
  This paper investigates the empirical implications of the various theories for EMU’s effect on 
wage restraint—the degree to which wage increases do or do not exceed productivity growth. In so doing, 
we attempt to avoid the second difficulty noted above. Wage restraint in some sense automatically con-
trols for country-specific effects and shocks, beyond those directly accounted for in the observable labor 
and monetary institutions, because it is defined as a response to a given country’s productivity perform-
ance, not a function of the level. It is also explicitly and frequently cited as a primary conscious concern of 
labor leadership, employers, and central bankers, who are presumed to be the actors in these models—and 
in the reality of wage bargaining and monetary policymaking. We also hope to partially alleviate the first 
difficulty, of inherently limited observations, by focusing on this dependent variable rather than inflation 
or unemployment, the determinants of which are perhaps too difficult to pin down. To our knowledge, 
no paper in this context has made wage restraint itself the focus of its empirical work.8 In addition, taking 
advantage of the time that has passed since the launch of the euro, we add to our cross-sectional work a 
comparison of time-series behavior in two critical countries, Germany and Italy, that differ markedly in 
what the theories predict would be the effect of EMU on wage restraint. 
  We find that wage restraint either is unchanged or has increased following EMU in the vast 
majority of countries, with no instances of significant declines in restraint. This finding contradicts the 
predictions of a widely cited family of models that rest on labor’s representatives in wage bargaining 
6.  Blanchard (2005) is particularly articulate on the challenge presented to such cross-national datasets by the existence of a 
multiplicity of shocks. Calmfors (199) and Driffill (2005) also note these limitations.
7.  Richard Freeman raised this concern in initial comments on Calmfors and Driffill (1988). This is not true of all empirical 
investigations (e.g., Layard, Nickell, and Jackman [1991] estimate wage equations before turning to unemployment outcomes), 
but most focus on inflation or unemployment directly. Some of the models, such as those of Cukierman and Lippi (1999, 2001), 
map directly from real wages to aggregate outcomes.
8.  Of course, the concept of wage restraint and its importance is well established. Bruno and Sachs (1985) first brought in the 
modern concept of the wage gap and related it to institutions, and many of the papers cited in footnote 2 deal with real wage 
determination. Bean (1994, 2005); Blanchard (1991, 2000); Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991); and Nickell, Nunziata, and 
Ochel (2005) all consider the role of real wage rigidities in determining unemployment. Yet, the empirical linkage between wage 
restraint and changes in monetary policy regimes to our knowledge remains uninvestigated.Page 
taking into account the external effect of their demands on aggregate inflation. In particular, one would 
have expected Germany to display the greatest decline in wage restraint under these models, given that 
the relative importance of its major unions in the central bank’s calculus of inflationary pressures declined 
most with respect to both size and weighting by the central bank (given the shift from Bundesbank to the 
ECB), and we find no indication of such a decline. If anything, wage restraint in Germany increased post-
EMU. 
  The overall shift in the countries examined toward greater wage restraint is consistent with the 
models that emphasize the gains to macroeconomic stability from monetary credibility, downplaying 
coordination or labor centralization issues. The time-series evidence on Italy, which shows a significant 
increase in wage restraint after eurozone entry, also supports this view, given that the restraint is mostly 
determined by the degree of monetary credibility (proxied by the Italian interest rate differential versus 
the lowest government bond rate in the eurozone). That said, the increase in wage restraint associated 
with increased monetary credibility in the eurozone is matched by that shown to be associated with the 
increase in credibility seen in the United Kingdom and Sweden after adoption of inflation targeting post-
1992. This result emphasizes that the effect being seen is due to monetary regime changes and perhaps 
global pressures on labor bargaining power and not due to EMU per se, political coordination issues, or 
international integration that accompanied EMU.
  Section II further elaborates on our definition of wage restraint, its operationalization, and the 
distribution of outcomes in our sample. Section III goes through the implications of five major theories 
about the determinants of wage restraint for what should happen after EMU and whether or not non-
eurozone advanced economies should see a similar effect. Section IV presents our cross-sectional analysis, 
looking at the extent of wage restraint before and after EMU in a sample of 19 economies (of which elev-
en are EMU members) and its determinants. Section V sets out our time-series analysis of the movements 
in wage restraint controlling for the business cycle in Germany and Italy and whether those dynamics 
changed after convergence in interest rates (our operationalization of monetary credibility) and the shift 
in monetary decision making from the Bundesbank to the ECB. Section VI considers the implications for 
two major theoretical approaches to the determinants of wage restraint and for policy, given what seems 
to be clear evidence in support of one and in apparent rejection of the other.
II. ROLE AND MEASUREMENT OF WAGE RESTRAINT
Central bankers and financial-market observers often refer to the degree of wage restraint in a country or 
in a given wage negotiation, by which they mean the degree to which increases in real wages are com-
mensurate with increases in (labor) productivity. As argued by Bruno and Sachs (1985), the existence of Page 
a real wage gap—a persistent rise in real wages unmatched by productivity—can explain stagflation in 
the 1970s. In a more recent example, the extensive and persistent high unemployment in the former East 
Germany is usually attributed to a lasting wage bargain that overpriced eastern labor relative to its produc-
tivity.9 Others (e.g., Ball and Moffitt 2001, Blanchard and Philippon 200) attribute part of the rise and 
in some countries fall of the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) to the lags with 
which wage setters recognized shifts in productivity growth. This attribution is of course loosely analogous 
to “classical” views of unemployment, where labor is overpriced relative to its returns, as opposed to more 
“Keynesian” views where nominal rigidities and insufficient demand are the root cause.10  
  Assessment of wage restraint continues to play a significant role in the determination of monetary 
policy now that all central banks in advanced economies, including the ECB, are committed to forward-
looking strategies for the stabilization of low inflation. The belief that wage increases “out of line with pro-
ductivity” are potentially inflationary is widespread. Consider the example of the German economy and 
Bundesbank behavior in the 1950–70 period, when economic growth was accompanied by union wage 
restraint, with real wages rising but less than the rate of growth in productivity—and the Bundesbank 
explicitly threatened to raise interest rates should wage demands be “excessive” (Deutsche Bundesbank 
1998; Streeck 1994; Siebert 2005, chapter 4). Streeck 1994; Siebert 2005, chapter 4). The decline in the US unemployment rate in the 1990s is 
widely attributed in large measure to interaction between the outpacing of wage growth by productivity 
growth and the readiness of the Federal Reserve partly as a result to maintain low interest rates even as 
past benchmarks for growth and unemployment were surpassed.11
  It must be noted that wage restraint is not an entirely neutral concept distributionally. An 
increase in wages above the rate of productivity growth will embody some combination of pass-through 
of inflationary expectations, of (mis)perception of the rate of productivity growth, and of an increase in 
labor’s share of income relative to capital.12 Since ultimately factors of production would be expected to 
earn their marginal products over the long term, this is less of an issue for multiyear averages than for 
any specific year’s wage settlement, but after some years of wage restraint, it could well be reasonable for 
9.  See the summary and references in Posen (2006, chapter 6). The “overpricing” in turn can be attributed to the incentives for 
union insiders in then West Germany to prevent low-wage competition for their membership.
10.  As Caballero and Hammour (1996) and Blanchard (2005) point out, though, even if a wage gap story can be used to explain 
much of the rise of European unemployment in the 1970s and early 1980s, it cannot be assigned a leading role in the persistence 
and, in some European countries, continued rise of unemployment in more recent years, precisely because there has been a period 
of relative wage restraint.
11.  Blinder and Yellen (2001) articulate this position very well from the point of view of Federal Reserve decision makers. 
12.  As we are considering aggregate measures of wage restraint, we are abstracting from the bargaining over rents and quasi-rents 
between firms and unions, which are also a component of wage growth when considered at the sectoral or individual firm level.Page 
labor’s share to catch up by growing above productivity temporarily.1 As Caballero and Hammour (1996) 
and Blanchard and Philippon (200) point out, on average capital’s share of income has been rising 
along with unemployment in Europe since the mid-1980s, suggesting that in recent years wage restraint 
has been ample and that the real wage gap therefore is not the source of current unemployment.14 The 
relevant point for our analysis is that we focus on year-to-year wage restraint because it is of declared and 
demonstrated importance to monetary policy decisions, not because it is necessarily an optimal interme-
diate target for central banks or because it is welfare enhancing in and of itself.
  Operationally, we define wage restraint as the difference between the rate of real wage growth and 
productivity growth for a given country in a given year. A negative (positive) observation indicates below 
(above) productivity wage growth. We use two measures of productivity from the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). One is multifactor productivity (MFP) growth result-
ing as the residual from the OECD’s growth accounting exercises; the other is growth in GDP per hour 
worked, calculated from national accounts data. The two measures are highly though not precisely cor-
related for multiyear averages, so we report all results below for both measures (where data are available). 
For consistency, we also rely on the OECD’s total compensation per employee measure from its Economic 
Outlook as the source for our wage data. While we also undertook parallel investigations with the OECD’s 
more narrowly defined “wage rate, business sector” series, we prefer total compensation because the data 
coverage is more complete and because the anecdotal evidence is that central banks pay more attention 
to changes in total compensation than in wages per se. Also, arguably there are wage negotiations where 
wage increases are kept low, but additional benefits with regard to pensions or the like are part of the 
package. To get real wage growth, we deflate each observation by the country-specific deflator (productiv-
ity growth is of course automatically in real terms).
  Table 1 presents basic data on wage restraint for our full sample of 21 countries, comprising the 
12 eurozone members, the three EU members outside the eurozone (Denmark, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom), and six other advanced economies (Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, Switzerland, and the 
United States). For three (Luxembourg, Norway, and Switzerland), data are available only on GDP per 
hour growth and not on MFP growth. Since the focus of the paper is on the impact of EMU on wage 
1.  In current monetary policymaking, the analogy would be made to a supply-shock that embodied a relative price shift. If the 
relative price of labor was going up due to structural reasons, and not simply as a response to broader price pressures, the central 
bank could accommodate the relative price shift by only gradually tightening in response to any inflationary effects and largely 
withholding any interest rate response unless/until there were “second-round effects” of the wage increase on inflation expecta-
tions.
14.  The outlier status of the US economy with regard to income and wealth inequality is not attributable to wage restraint either. 
As Dew-Becker and Gordon (2005) and Piketty and Saez (2006) recently demonstrated, the large increase in income going to the 
top 1 and 0.1 percent of earners in the United States over the recent decade is largely due to the extraordinary rise in executive 
pay cumulated over several years.Page 
restraint, we compute annual averages for the pre-euro (1991–98) and post-euro (1999–200 or 2004) 
periods, subject to data availability. The mean and median change in wage restraint in the sample is nega-
tive, meaning greater restraint in the post-euro period, for both measures of productivity. On productivity 
measured by MFP, the mean change is just short of being significantly different from zero at the 5 percent 
significance level (it is at the 7 percent significance level) and on the order of one percentage point (of the 
gap between productivity and wage growth) per year. Two countries, Greece and Sweden, show a sig-
nificant increase in wage restraint under both measures, and two, Australia and the Netherlands, show a 
significant decrease in restraint under both measures, as can be seen more clearly in figure 1. Overall most 
EMU members showed no significant change in wage restraint post-EMU.15 
III. FIVE THEORIES OF THE DETERMINANTS OF WAGE RESTRAINT
At any given moment, both unions and individual workers are conducting wage negotiations with em-
ployers. Results of most negotiations are determined by idiosyncratic factors specific to sectors, firms, or 
individuals. Other negotiations are largely determined by automatic factors like cost of living allowances, 
although their significance has declined since the 1970s. The overall macroeconomic environment, in-
cluding productivity growth, however, also plays a role in wage negotiations, particularly since individual 
or industry productivity is often difficult to verify in real time. As bargaining becomes more collective and 
centralized, and especially when it takes place at a national level, such aggregate measures take on an even 
greater importance. Similarly, as central banks become more focused on maintaining low inflation (rather 
than reducing high inflation or pursuing other medium-term goals), the extent of wage pressures relative 
to productivity growth across the economy becomes a more salient issue. From these rather innocuous 
observations arise a number of theories about how labor and monetary institutions should influence wage 
restraint. Table 2 summarizes these theories with their empirical implication for restraint and whether 
they apply solely to eurozone members.
  The first set of theories builds directly on Calmfors and Driffill (1988) and concerns the extent to 
which unions take into account the inflationary impact of their wage bargains as a function of their mem-
bership. The more encompassing the membership (i.e., the greater the share of workers represented by the 
union), the more the union internalizes the cost of inflation induced by wage pressures and thus the more 
15.  Greece clearly has by far the largest change in wage restraint. Dropping Greece from our sample would of course drive down 
the average change observed but also decrease the standard deviation of changes observed, so the number of (eurozone) countries 
showing a significant increase in wage restraint in fact rises in that subsample. Details available from the authors upon request.Page 
likely it is to exercise wage restraint.16 In particular, Cukierman and Lippi (1999, 2001) and Iversen and 
Soskice (1998, 2000) develop models of games between the ECB and unions as compared with the form 
of wage bargaining within countries before EMU. Both sets of papers predict that after EMU there will 
be a coordination problem. Unions that used to be large relative to their respective country’s total labor 
force, and whose bargaining their respective country’s central banks would have to take into account as a 
result when the latter was focused on national inflation rates, will after EMU become small(er) relative to 
the eurozonewide labor market and will not have to be taken into account by an ECB focused on euro-
zonewide inflation. 
  As a result, these models predict that wage restraint will decline after EMU. Unions’ incentives 
for wage restraint are reduced in two ways: one, “excessive” wage demands will have less effect on overall 
inflation so the cost to the unions’ members will be lower; two, and probably more importantly, wage 
restraint from unions within one country will be less likely to induce monetary ease from the ECB—and 
therefore growth and employment increases—that benefits their members because the impact on euro-
zone-wide inflation will be smaller (countries where unions were already small or decentralized or absent 
would simply move further toward irrelevance for ECB monetary policymaking). So economies of large 
size before EMU where the central bank pursued an independent (nationally oriented as opposed to 
exchange-pegged) monetary policy should exhibit a significant decrease in wage restraint post-EMU—and 
this should be most marked in Germany, where not only was the economy the largest, while the Bundes-
bank most clearly took into account domestic wage developments when setting policy, but also the unions 
were large, and there was (is) nationwide wage bargaining. There is no reason to think that this shift 
should affect non-eurozone member countries.
  The second set of theories relates to the degree of international competition in product markets 
and was formalized by Danthine and Hunt (1994). In this framework, unions have some concern for 
the employment of their membership and recognize that employment will in part depend upon the price 
competitiveness of their home country’s firms on world markets.17 If wage increases outstrip productiv-
ity while other countries’ producers benefit from wage restraint, the home country producers could lose 
market share, and the union members could lose jobs. As a result, the greater the exposure to interna-
tional competition, the greater the wage restraint (Danthine and Hunt [1994] portray this as a shift in the 
16.   In their famous U-shaped curve, Calmfors and Driffill (1988) suggest that extreme decentralization of wage bargaining will 
also lead to wage restraint because atomistic workers bargaining individually cannot drive up inflationary pressures. For purposes 
of considering the effects of EMU, the issue is whether economies on the “right” side of the hump with more concentrated wage 
bargaining move toward the suboptimal center where less internalization takes place, so we focus on that end here.
17.   Katzenstein (1984) first suggested this feedback effect in his study of small states in world markets. Such internalization 
of competitiveness concerns, however, is also a staple of policy discussions where there is tripartite bargaining. See, for example, 
Honohan and Lane’s (2002) depiction of the role of negotiated wage restraint in providing the conditions for the recent Irish 
miracle.Page 
Calmfors-Driffill curve). In the context of EMU, we can derive the prediction that to the extent that the 
introduction of the euro increased intra-eurozone trade, whether through increased transparency, lower 
transaction costs, or other means, there should be greater wage restraint within the eurozone.18
  A third set of theories comes more directly out of the political science tradition, though econo-
mists on the left in Europe sometimes support it. In this approach, the models of games between the 
ECB and labor unions become matters of outright bargaining between interest groups—where the ECB 
(like most central banks) is characterized as emphasizing inflation versus growth and employment ob-
jectives, while the labor representatives pursue the reverse (Garrett 1998, Hibbs 1987). The greater the 
political pull of the unions vis-à-vis the central bank, whether through threat of direct action because of 
union density and centralization or via the influence of elected representatives favoring union objectives, 
the lower the wage restraint because the central bank would be less willing (politically able) to “cut off” 
growth in the economy. Absent the threat to tighten policy, the central bank would be unable to prevent 
a rise in labor share, which would mean real wage growth outpacing productivity. This approach would 
predict that after EMU, wage restraint would increase because the ECB would be less accountable to 
democratic control (given its insulation from national politicians), and there is no comparable Europe-
wide labor institution to bargain on workers’ behalf. In particular, the countries where unions were more 
centralized and thus had greater political influence at home should see the greatest declines in wage 
restraint post-EMU.
  A fourth set of theories has more to do with globalization and its impact on industrial democra-
cies in general than with EMU per se. Given the effective rise in labor supply from emerging markets, 
which competes with production workers in advanced economies, and the increase in international capital 
mobility and institutions that make shifting of production to lower-cost sites easier, first-world work-
ers face increasing pressure to remain competitive, if not decrease their unit labor costs. Add to this the 
more general trend toward deunionization in the major economies, or at least their private sectors, and 
the pressure for wage restraint should increase (Dumont, Rayp, and Willemé 2006).19 This set of theories 
is in many ways parallel to the second set of theories regarding openness to competition, but rather than 
emphasizing the change in incentives for given union structures and densities, this framework suggests 
a decline in those union densities. Thus the empirical prediction of this approach is that wage restraint 
should increase—both in and outside the eurozone—but primarily for the larger countries where labor 
18.  The discussion of the size of the increase in intra-European trade due to the adoption of the euro remains lively, with some 
very large estimates (e.g., Rose 2000) offered. See Baldwin (2005) and Frankel (2005) for a constructive debate over the accumu-
lated empirical evidence.
19.  Whether the trend to deunionization is a result of these forces or is itself an independent cause, at least in part, is beyond the 
scope of this paper.Page 10
was less subject to international competitive pressure in the past than in small countries that are already 
open.
  The final set of theories of the determinants of wage restraint are those proposed by monetary 
economists and central bankers suggesting positive structural effects from EMU (e.g., European Monetary 
Institute 1998). In this framework, in economies where the central bank’s commitment to price stability 
was less than credible, unions and workers had less incentive to take into account the costs of their own 
pursuit of inflationary wage settlements. On the one hand, their real wages were more likely to be eroded 
by increases in inflation, which would arise out of others’ wage and price expectations (and negotiations), 
so union negotiators would feel they had more at risk from wage restraint; on the other hand, the likeli-
hood of short-term costs to employment from “excessive” wage settlements would be lower because the 
central bank would be less credible in its threats to tighten policy should wage pressures rise.20 This is the 
converse of the Bundesbank story behind the first set of theories discussed and as such is usually thought 
of as applying to Italy, for example, in the postwar period through the 1970s (or later). A rise in the 
credibility of central banks’ commitment to price stability should therefore induce greater wage restraint 
by reducing the fear that restraint will be self-defeating and increasing the fear that the central bank will 
not accommodate wage increases. This theory’s empirical prediction is that wage restraint should increase 
most for those countries that have the greatest increases in monetary credibility, whether through mem-
bership in EMU or through other means (such as the adoption of an inflation target).
IV. CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF POST-EMU CHANGES IN WAGE RESTRAINT
As discussed above, the limited number of observations available when considering these issues among 
the industrialized democracies encourages prudence in the use and interpretation of econometric analysis. 
Accordingly, when trying to sort out the impact of EMU on wage restraint, and the various theories of the 
determinants of wage restraint discussed in the preceding section, we stick to a simple approach. For those 
countries for which we have pre- and post-EMU average wage restraint observations (a total of 18),21 we 
estimate ordinary least squares regressions of the form:
  ∆WR = β0 + β1*eurodum + β2*(union variable) + β*(union variable*eurodum) 
  + β4*(∆monetary credibility) + β5*(∆monetary credibility*eurodum) + ε                      (1)
20.  Obviously, we do not assume a stable trade-off between inflation and unemployment or the absence of costs to inflation, 
hence the mention of “short-term costs to employment,” since presumably central bank laxity would at some point induce real 
costs either from extra inflation and/or sharper tightening of policy.
21.   As shown in table 1, we are missing observations for Luxembourg, Norway, and Switzerland.Page 11
where “eurodum” denotes membership in the eurozone, “union variable” is a measure of union density or 
centralization or coordination (taken from the literature), and “∆monetary credibility” is a measure of the 
change in the credibility of the central bank’s commitment to price stability between the two periods. 
  We use different trade union variables as a robustness check of our results. The first indicator is 
“trade union density,” obtained from the OECD’s Employment Outlook 2004, which utilized survey results 
to calculate this variable. We use the data on density in 1990 and 2000, labelling the variable “TUdense” 
in the estimation output. As a separate variable to control for trade union influence, we also use collective 
bargaining coverage, which is expressed as the fraction of the total labor force covered by collective bar-
gaining. The OECD compiled the collective bargaining coverage rates, which it took or estimated from 
several sources (including direct submissions from national governments). Wherever possible, coverage 
rates were adjusted for employees (particularly in the public sector) who do not have full rights to bargain, 
though some public-sector workers obviously do (OECD’s OECD’s Employment Outlook 2004, chapter ). Once . Once 
again, we take values for 1990 and 2000 as pre- and post-EMU variables. Centralization and coordina-
tion of wage bargaining are the final two measures of trade union sway. These are constructed using survey 
data, also from the OECD, and are presented in the form of a cardinal scale from 1 to 5, increasing in 
half-point increments to indicate greater centralization/coordination.
  We proxy the change in monetary credibility by the difference between monthly long-term (10-
year) government bond yields averaged for 1995m1 to 1997m12 and 1998m1 to 2000m12.22 A bigger 
difference indicates a larger decline in government bond rates and thus in inflation expectations and in 
doubts about the central bank’s commitment to price stability. As shown in figure 2, there is a wide range 
of changes, with almost all economies in the sample seeing a minimum drop in bond rates of 150 basis 
points between the two periods considered, due presumably to global changes in inflation, the business 
cycle, and international arbitrage as the US and Japanese rates sank. Within Europe, as one might expect, 
Italy had the largest gain in credibility from EMU (more than 200 basis points above the eurozone aver-
age), with Portugal and Spain gaining next most, and then Greece.2 Notably, however, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom also had substantial drops in long bond rates, higher than the average eurozone member, 
over the period despite staying out of the eurozone.
  Given the predictions of the various theories as outlined in table 2, the effects of wage bargain-
ing structure and density, conditional (or not) on eurozone membership, and of monetary credibility 
should allow us to distinguish between them (if the data are willing). Table  presents our results from 
22.  The data are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database. The first average ends in 1997m12 to allow for 
changes in bond yields in anticipation of EMU, and the horizons are shorter before and after than the wage restraint horizons to 
focus on the credibility impact of monetary regime shifts at the time.
2.  Greece itself did not join the eurozone until January 2001, so the change seen here is assumed to have captured only part of 
EMU’s impact on the economy’s inflation expectations, with markets discounting until membership was sure.Page 1
these cross-sectional (not panel) estimates (see appendix A for list of variables and data sources). The three 
sets of estimates present a consistent set of results. An increase in monetary credibility has a significant 
increasing effect (at the 5 percent significance level) on wage restraint, and this result is not dependent on 
eurozone membership (the (b) estimations) but is associated with all variation in monetary credibility in 
the sample.24 The effect is economically meaningful as well with a 100 basis point drop in long bond rates 
associated with a 0.42 percent increase in wage restraint (the differential between productivity growth and 
real wage growth in percent terms). Given an average for the sample of change (increase) in wage restraint 
of 0.68 percent, this is a substantial effect. Such a large effect associated with decreased long-term interest 
rates is consistent with the last of the theories discussed in the preceding section: that greater central bank 
credibility would induce greater wage restraint. Given the imprecise estimates of the constant terms and of 
most of the coefficients on the other explanatory variables, changes in monetary credibility alone appear 
to explain 40 percent of the cross-national variation in changes in wage restraint.25
  Trade union density interacted with economy size (TUdense*gdp) shows up as significant in the 
third regression, with a negative sign (it also has a negative coefficient significant at the 10 percent level in 
the first column, the other place it appears). The magnitudes are quite small, however, with coefficient es-
timates on the order of 0.00001. This would be weak evidence against the fourth set of theories discussed 
in the preceding section, since it implies that declining trade union density, conditional on being in a 
country large enough to have had some independence of labor supply, decreases wage restraint. It seems 
consistent with Calmfors-Driffill’s underlying intuition that moving toward decentralization in the mid-
range of unionization would reduce incentives to restraint. The average economic size in our sample is 
US$1,16.29 million (IMF’s World Economic Outlook 1999). This means that a fall in trade union density 
from the sample average of 40 to 20 percent would lead to a nontrivial decline in wage restraint of 0.16 
percentage point. Yet for the hump-shape argument, it is a problem that the sample mean of the density 
is 40 percent, since that would seem to put any declines in density to the right of the hump and therefore 
likely to lead to greater restraint.
  Trade union density on its own, when not interacted with size of GDP, does not appear to be sig-
nificant, just as the other measures of labor union organization and wage bargaining centralization do not, 
whether interacted with economic size or eurozone membership. This result is inconsistent with the third 
24.  Note that wage restraint is defined to be negative (wage growth minus productivity growth), so the more negative the num-
ber, the greater the restraint. This is why there is a positive coefficient on the credibility variable: cred1 is also negative, represent-
ing a fall in long-term rates from pre-EMU to post-EMU period.
25.  Given the size of the increase in intra-eurozone trade, this result seems to be a particularly clear rejection either of the hy-
pothesis that an increase in trade openness and competition should increase wage restraint or of the assumption that a removal of 
(intra-eurozone) currency variation should make trade more competitive. The relative clarity of this result may be in part a func-
tion of the more direct measurement of this explanatory variable than of changes in labor market institutions.Page 1
set of theories in section II: that declining political power or centralization of unions after EMU insulated 
monetary policymaking from dealing with labor would explain the observed increase in wage restraint. 
The extent of trade within the eurozone (EMUtrade2), presumably the exposure to international competi-
tion most directly affected by the launch of the euro, also does not show up as having a significant effect 
on wage restraint, as opposed to the hypothesized positive coefficient.26 As with the monetary credibility 
hypothesis, the determinants of wage restraint in the advanced countries appear on this data to be global 
(or by country) rather than associated with eurozone membership.
  Particularly striking is the apparent rejection of the best formally developed theories of determi-
nation of wage restraint: those hypothesizing that a coordination problem would arise after EMU with 
the countries previously having unions that were large enough to internalize the costs of “excessive” wage 
demands showing a decline in wage restraint. As suggested in table 1, which shows the sample averages, 
the cross-sectional analysis in table  confirms that there is no association between the centralization or 
coordination of wage bargaining, whether conditional on size or not, and wage restraint for eurozone 
members—or for any countries in the sample. Since two distinct sets of models (Cukierman and Lippi 
1999, 2001; Iversen and Soskice 1998, 2000) both make the strong prediction that wage restraint should 
have gone down after EMU, in contrast to the other theories predicting conditional increases in re-
straint—and instead wage restraint went up on average, and significantly so even when taking account of 
the institutional factors underlying these models—it seems time to reconsider those models. Before doing 
so, however, we turn to time-series data to examine from another angle the empirical validity of the clear 
and contrasting predictions of the first (wage restraint down conditional on EMU and wage bargaining 
structure) and last (wage restraint up conditional on change in monetary credibility but not on EMU) 
theories from table 2.
V. TIME-SERIES ANALYSIS OF WAGE RESTRAINT IN GERMANY AND ITALY
We are now into the seventh year since the launch of the euro. It is feasible to undertake time-series analy-
sis of even low-frequency data that span the periods before and after EMU, in order to look for EMU’s 
impact. With regard to wage restraint, the question is whether the adoption of the euro made any differ-
ence to year-by-year wage negotiations, given expected central bank reactions or nonreactions according 
to some theories. In the previous section we analyzed differences in multiyear averages for a set of 18 
26.  Given the size of the increase in intra-eurozone trade, and the incidence of that expansion only for eurozone members, this 
result appears to be a particularly clear rejection of the trade competition increases restraint hypothesis. The relative clarity of this 
result may in part be a function of the more direct measurement of this explanatory variable than of the coding of labor market 
institutions, however.Page 1
countries; in this section we turn to cyclical variation (or not) in wage restraint as a function of interest 
rates and structural factors for a pair of countries from 1980 to 200. While we leave for future research 
the estimation of the interaction between central bank reaction functions and wage equations, we hope to 
distinguish between the factors affecting wage restraint by carefully choosing the cases to consider.
  Comparing the time-series behavior and determinants of wage restraint in Germany and Italy 
should allow us to see which effects of the euro are and are not evident. Germany was the economy with 
the de facto anchor currency of the pre-euro European Monetary System and had some of the largest 
unions with some of the most centralized and coordinated wage bargaining institutions in Europe. This 
combination of central bank independence (legally and in interest-rate setting) with centralized wage 
bargaining should have produced great incentives for wage restraint in Germany pre-EMU, according to 
the theories that emphasized incentives for union internalization of inflation costs. By the same token, 
the entry of Germany into the eurozone should have produced a marked drop in wage restraint—the 
German unions became notably smaller relative to the economic zone relevant for monetary policymak-
ing, and monetary policymaking shifted away most clearly from a focus on German domestic inflation. 
In short, if the Cukierman-Lippi/Iversen-Soskice story in the spirit of Calmfors and Driffill should show 
up anywhere, it should be in a significant decline in wage restraint in Germany post-EMU. For fans of 
the monetary credibility story, there should either be no effect (assuming, as bond markets indeed seem 
to, that the ECB has just as credible a commitment to price stability as the Bundesbank did) or a slight 
decline in wage restraint.
  For Italy, a different set of expectations is generated. As shown in figure 2, Italy enjoyed the larg-
est credibility gain for its monetary policy commitment to low inflation upon admission to the eurozone. 
Prior to this credibility gain, Italy should have exhibited low wage restraint according to the theories 
emphasizing monetary credibility. In an economy where indexing was rife and inflation expectations were 
high and unanchored, there should have been little incentive for unions to exercise wage restraint—and 
little reason to think that the central bank would tighten policy in response to excessive wage growth.27 
After EMU, with a large gain in counterinflationary credibility for Italian monetary policy (set by the 
ECB), Italian unions and wage bargainers should have shown a significant increase in wage restraint. 
  Even if the ECB were not setting policy on the basis of Italian wage developments, the eurozone 
more generally would be following a policy consistent with price stability, while the Italian economy 
would no longer be able to devalue or inflate at (political) will. If the monetary credibility story in the 
27.  Some commentators will insist that the Banca d’Italia did have significant counterinflationary credibility from the time of its 
“divorce” from the Italian Treasury or with the advent of later reforms. This begs credulity, given the revealed drop in long bond 
rates upon eurozone entry and the prior devaluations from the exchange rate mechanism (ERM)—let alone the desire of Banca 
d’Italia senior officials to gain eurozone entry.Page 1
spirit of the postwar Bundesbank beliefs should show up anywhere, it should be in an increase in wage 
restraint in Italy post-EMU. Of course, according to the wage bargaining coordination problem theories, 
Italy as a large economy should be subject to a lesser version of the same phenomenon besetting German 
wage bargaining with the move into the eurozone and so should show no effect on, or a slight decrease in, 
wage restraint post-EMU.
  To examine the determinants of wage restraint in these two critical country case studies, we look 
at annual data from 1980 to 200 for compensation and productivity growth. In contrast to the cross-
sectional data on multiyear averages, here we utilize annual nominal compensation growth (from OECD 
2004) along with contemporaneous GDP per hour growth (from Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre 2006) to construct wage restraint. The switch from nominal to real wages is to take into account 
the money illusion and more broadly the difficulty for workers and unions in discerning real productivity 
growth in real time. The actual computations of real GDP per hour or of the residual from growth regres-
sions that economists produce and we use above only appear with a lag usually of several months to actual 
events, whereas often wage negotiations are on an annual or two- to three-year basis and are conducted in 
nominal terms.
  To examine the competing hypotheses, we estimate on German and Italian data separately regres-
sions of the form:
  WR = β0 + β1*Output Gap + β2*inflation expectations + β*EMU dummy 
  + β4*nominal central bank interest rate + β5*additional variables + ε                                    (2)
where the additional variables include trade within the European Union, trade union density, and the 
spread between the country’s and Swiss long-term bond rates as a proxy for the nation’s central bank cred-
ibility. In the absence of time-series data on trade union density, we use the share of private-sector em-
ployment in the economy. Inflation expectations were obtained by Chinn and Frankel (200)—they take 
the average of month-to-month annual consumer price index growth at 12-month leads and use it as an 
inflation expectation proxy. Our main interest is to see whether the EMU dummy is significant and nega-
tive, particularly for Germany, which would be consistent with the wage coordination story, or significant 
and positive, particularly for Italy, which would be consistent with the monetary credibility story.
  Tables 4 and 5 present the results for Germany and Italy respectively (see appendix A for list of 
variables and data sources). All regressions have 24 observations except those in column II of each table, 
where data limitations on the trade union density variable limit us to 1 observations. For Germany (table 
4), we find the only factor significantly affecting wage restraint is the central bank instrument interest 
rate (which is consistent with the Bundesbank wage restraint and deterrence story), with rises in that rate Page 1
increasing restraint. Interestingly, the sole significance of this variable does not change after EMU, seem-
ingly implying that German wage bargainers continue to keep their eye on the ECB response to their ne-
gotiations much as they did on the Bundesbank’s response. Surprisingly, even the German output gap and 
inflation expectations have no significant direct effects on wage restraint in Germany. There is no evidence 
in any of the estimates that a structural break occurred around German economic unification in 1990–91, 
so we do not report separate results. This is not entirely surprising given the small share and separation of 
the eastern German labor market in overall German employment. Finally, there is evidence of a statisti-
cally significant (but not economically large) effect of the public budget deficit on wage bargaining (model 
VI), where a larger deficit increases wage restraint, perhaps in anticipation of either budget cutbacks or 
monetary response. This factor also accounts reasonably well for year-to-year variation in wage restraint in 
Germany in all estimates I-V even though the central bank interest rate is the sole significant explanator.
  For Italy (table 5), unemployment turns out to be a better measure than the output gap of the 
importance of the business cycle and has a consistently significant effect in the intuitive direction: an 
increase in unemployment increases wage restraint. Meanwhile EMU membership per se does not come 
in significantly for Italy, nor does the central bank interest rate itself—perhaps reflecting the de facto lack 
of independence of Italian monetary policy over the period. A direct measure of inflation expectations, 
however, is estimated to have a significant (5 or 10 percent level) and positive coefficient across most 
specifications, including ones where the EMU dummy is included, meaning that when there is a decrease 
in inflation expectations, wage restraint increases. In a similar spirit, the spread between the Italian and 
Swiss long-term government bond rates has a significant positive coefficient; when the spread increases, 
consistent with a decline in Italian monetary credibility, wage restraint diminishes. That this shows up 
strongly in Italy is consistent with the predictions of the monetary credibility theory of wage restraint. 
Unlike in Germany, there is no evidence that budget deficits have any effect on wage restraint, but like in 
Germany the various measures of trade union structure and trade have no discernable impact.28
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Enhanced monetary credibility, as proxied by the decrease in the long government bond rate after the 
launch of the euro, can explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation in the observed in-
crease in wage restraint seen in European countries since 1999. The effect of monetary credibility on wage 
restraint is not limited to eurozone members, though; countries such as Sweden and the United King-
dom, which had a similarly measured gain in central bank commitment to price stability, also saw similar 
28.   In both the German and Italian time-series, one might expect the trade union coordination, centralization, and density 
variables to have limited explanatory power given their limited variation over the period.Page 1
significant increases in wage restraint. This effect occurred completely independently of the wage bargain-
ing institutions in the countries involved. In fact, in contradiction of the theories that suggested a coordi-
nation problem would emerge post-EMU between labor representatives and the ECB in large economies 
where bargaining was centralized and conducted with their national central banks prior to EMU, there 
is no evidence of a decline in wage restraint in those countries. A closer look at time-series evidence for 
Germany, where that hypothesized effect was supposed to be strongest, offers no support for the theo-
ries; time-series evidence for Italy on the variation of interest rate spreads over time, on the other hand, 
strongly supports the view that monetary credibility matters irrespective of wage bargaining arrangements.
  As always in this literature, given the limited sample of countries involved and the limited data 
(both cross-sectional and time-series) available on institutional change, these results cannot be taken as 
dispositive. Yet, despite the data limitations, the results presented here are surprisingly robust and clear, 
perhaps benefiting from the focus on the narrowly defined wage restraint variable. Given the strength 
of the predictions of the Cukierman-Lippi (1999, 2001) and Iversen-Soskice (1998, 2000) models that 
EMU should lead to a decline in wage restraint, particularly in large countries, the apparent rejection 
of those predictions should be taken seriously. The ECB has put a lower weight on individual countries’ 
cyclical and wage developments—particularly Germany’s—than the pre-EMU Bundesbank did when 
setting monetary policy (Posen and Popov Gould 2006; Hayo 2006), so the rejection is not because the 
ECB behaved contrary to expectations either in these models or more generally.
  For future research, then, these results lead naturally to questions of what on the labor institution 
side was at work that coordination problems did not arise in wage bargaining post-EMU and, instead, 
wage restraint rose. When labor representatives appear on the basis of these results to be forward look-
ing and concerned enough with macroeconomic conditions to respond to changes in counterinflationary 
credibility, it is somewhat surprising that the internalization dynamic for the effect of wage bargaining on 
inflation pressures does not carry through as well. Perhaps the labor representatives’ utility functions in 
the above models were simply misspecified, with too little regard for employment effects and too much 
for the costs of inflation. Shiller (1996) and survey work that followed established a healthy dislike for 
inflation among a wide range of the populace in many of the countries considered here, but that is not 
equivalent to establishing such a dislike among labor leaders, where anecdotal, political science, and 
historical evidence has tended to show labor as being far more concerned about output and employment 
than inflation (at least at low-to-moderate levels of inflation). 
  Another related possibility is that the importance of these labor and union institutions in wage 
bargaining behavior was overestimated by theorists. This could have occurred because actual coordination 
or centralization of labor bargaining in practice is fundamentally mismeasured by the available coded clas-
sifications. More moderately, while these institutions could have had some sway, they also could have al-Page 1
lowed for a great deal of variation in bargaining behavior over time, and those variations were not picked 
up in the available measures and thus drove down the estimates of the institutional codings’ impact 
our analyses. This scepticism may seem on the face of it unlikely, given the long emphasis on tripartite 
bargaining and corporatism in Europe, as well as the supposed recent successes of such mutual accom-
modation in Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and so the results here should not be used to impugn 
institutional factors altogether. Yet, it remains possible that the effect or effectiveness of these labor market 
institutions is endogenous to the political and economic forces in civil society and so produces the degree 
of wage restraint in keeping with the political pressures at any given time, largely irrespective of apparent 
form.29
  In any event, it may be necessary to go beyond investigating wage restraint (let alone unemploy-
ment or inflation outcomes) at the national level and consider sectoral differences in both wage bargain-
ing structures and degree of wage restraint. Such an approach might not only better distinguish between 
these potential explanations for the absence of impact of wage bargaining structures on changes in wage 
restraint in the OECD in the last 15 years but also allow for more direct grappling with the alternative 
hypotheses advanced in section III, particularly regarding the influence of globalization and competition 
on wage setting.0 
  For analysts of monetary policy, especially in the eurozone, at least one message is clear: The ECB 
has delivered wage restraint on the Bundesbank deterrence model where adoption of the euro led to cred-
ible declines in inflation expectations. This could be taken to indicate that concerns about establishing 
monetary toughness or the emergence of wage-push inflation pressures are unnecessary, especially since 
the adoption of inflation targeting in Sweden and the United Kingdom led to similar effects without any 
suggestion that they went through a similar proving process.
29.  See Posen (1998b) for a general discussion of the endogeneity of institutional impact in political economy and macroeco-
nomics.
0.  We are grateful to Philip Lane for this latter suggestion regarding globalization.Page 1
APPENDIX A   LIST OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
a. For cross-sectional analysis
Variable name                 Variable label Data source
cntry country name
MFPnom wage restraint: nominal compensation growth
     minus MFP growth
OECD’s Economic Outlook (for compensation);
OECD’s Productivity Database (for MFP, GDP per hour)
GDPnom wage restraint: nominal compensation growth
     minus GDP per hour growth
MFPreal wage restraint: nominal compensation growth 
     minus MFP growth
GDPreal wage restraint: real compensation growth
     minus GDP per hour growth
EMUtrade1 country’s trade with eurozone countries,
     average 1–
IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics database
EMUtrade country’s trade with eurozone countries,
       average 1–00
cred1 credibility gain from euro:
     pre-emptive convergence assumed
Government long-term bond yield data are from
IMF’s International Financial Statistics database
cred credibility gain from euro: no
      pre-emptive convergence assumed
central1 centralization of bargaining, 10–
central centralization of bargaining, 1–000
coordin1 coordination index, 10–
coordin coordination index, 1–000
collect1 collective bargaining coverage, 10
collect collective bargaining coverage, 000
TUdense0 trade union density, 10 OECD’s Employment Outlook 2004
TUdense0 trade union density, 000
gdp 1 GDP, current prices, billions of dollars IMF’s World Economic Outlook database
TUdense0*gdp interacted term: TU density in 10, GDP
TUdense0*gdp interacted term: TU density in 000, GDP
eurodum eurozone member dummy
cred1*eurodum interacted credibility with euro dummy
cred*eurodum interacted credibility with euro dummy
central1*gdp interacted centralization with GDP
central*gdp interacted centralization with GDP
central1*eurodum interacted centralization with euro dummy
central*eurodum interacted centralization with euro dummy
coordin1*eurodum interacted coordination with euro  dummy
coordin*eurodum interacted coordination with euro dummy
collect1*gdp interacted collective bargaining coverage
collect*gdp interacted collective bargaining coverage
Driffill (00)
(appendix continues next page)Page 0
APPENDIX A    (continued)
b. For Time-Series Analysis: Germany and Italy
Variable name            Variable label Data source
year time variable
restr_c_r wage restraint: contemporaneous,
    real compensation growth
Total compensation data from OECD (00);
GDP per hour from Groningen Growth and 
Development  Centre (00) restr_l_r wage restraint: 1 period lagged productivity
    growth, real compensation growth
restr_c_n wage restraint: contemporaneous, nominal   
    compensation growth
restr_l_n wage restraint: 1 period lagged productivity 
growth, nominal compensation growth
gap output gap OECD (00)
nongovtempl share of total employment not in
    public sector
unempl unemployment rate
structdefchng percent change in structural deficit
gdp GDP, billions of US dollars
TUden trade union density Visser (00)
inflexpect inflation expectations IMF’s International Financial Statistics database 
(1-month average m-to-m CPI growth, 1-month
 lead)
r Buba/ECB money market interest rate IMF’s International Financial Statistics database
spread Italian-Swiss long-term government bond 
     spread
trade_eu Italian trade with eurozone countries,   
     percent GDP
IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics database
trade_tot total Italian trade (X + M), percent GDP
EMU start of EMUIII dummy
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Table 1  Changes in average wage restraint between 1991–98 and 1999–2004
Country
   Real compensation
 minus MFP
Real compensation
minus GDP per hour
Australiab     0.010*   0.01*
Austriaa –0.00   0.00*
Belgium     0.00*  0.00
Canada –0.00 –0.00
Denmark    0.00*   0.00
Finland  –0.00   0.00
Franceb  –0.00 –0.00
Germanyc  –0.00    0.00*




Luxembourg      n.a.    0.00*
Netherlands    0.011*    0.010*
Norway      n.a.    0.00*
Portugala –0.00  0.00
Spainb –0.01                         –0.01
Sweden   –0.0* –0.01*
Switzerland n.a.  –0.01*
United Kingdom   –0.0*                         –0.01
United States –0.00                         –0.00
Average of EU1  –0.011  –0.00
Average of non-EU1  –0.00                         –0.00
Mean      –0.010    –0.00
Standard error        0.00       0.00
Median      –0.00    –0.001
Confidence level: 
       percent        0.011      0.00
* =  significantly different from the mean, at  percent.
MFP = multifactor productivity
n.a. = not available
a. MFP growth 1– average.
b. MFP growth 1–00 average.
c. 1– average.
Note: Differences between 11– and 1–00 averages of productivity growth 
and compensation growth are subtracted from each other.Page 
 Table 2  Hypotheses on the effect of EMU on wage restraint
Channel of







































Larger for large countries 




























Table 3   Cross-section wage restraint analysis: Regression results
Model 1 Model 1(b) Model 2 Model 2(b) Model 3 Model 3(b)
Variable Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t Coefficient P>t
TUdense0 0.0000 0. 0.0000 0.0 –0.0001 0. –0.0001 0.
TUdense0*gdp -0.0001 0.0 0.0000 0.   –0.0000* 0.0   0.0000 0.1
collect1 0.0001 0. 0.0001 0.
collect1*gdp 0.0000 0. 0.0000 0.
central*eurodum 0.0011 0. 0.000 0.0 0.000 0. 0.00
coordin*eurodum  0.00 0.0   0.00 0.0
cred1  0.00* 0.0  0.00* 0.0      0.00* 0.0
cred1*eurodum 0.00 0.0 0.001 0.   0.00 0.
EMUtrade 0.000 0. 0.00 0.0 -0.00 0. 0.000 0. -0.00 0. -0.001 0.
eurodum 0.00 0. 0.00 0. 0.00 0. -0.00 0. -0.01 0. -0.011 0.
_cons 0.00 0. -0.00 0. -0.001 0.0 -0.011 0. 0.010 0.1 0.001 0.
Adjusted R-squared 0. -0.0 0. -0.0 0.0 0.01
n 1 1 1 1 1 1
**, * = significant at 1and  percent levels, respectively.
Notes: “Real compensation growth-GDP per hour growth” is the dependent variable. Countries include EU-1 members, Australia, 
Canada, Japan, and the United States. X(b) signifies the same model as model X but interacting the credibility variable with the 
euro membership dummy.  For list of variables and sources, see appendix A.Page 
Table 4   Time-series analysis: German wage restraint, 1980–2003











gap –0.000 0.001 –0.00 0.00 –0.000 0.001 –0.001 0.00
r 0.00*** 0.00     0.00* 0.00    0.00** 0.00  0.00** 0.00
inflexpect  0. 0.   0. 0. 0.10 0. 0.0 0.







constant  –0.00*** 0.00 –0.0 0.0 0.1 0. –0.00 0.0
Adjusted 
     R-squared
0. 0. 0. 0.
n  1  









gap –0.001 0.00 –0.000 0.001 –0.001 0.00
r 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00
inflexpect 0.1 0.1 0.1 0. 0.1 0.0




trade_tot  –0.01 0.0
spread –0.001 0.00
structdefchng –0.000* 0 0 0
constant –0.0** 0.01 –0.0 0.00 0.1 0.01
Adjusted R-squared 0. 0. 0.
n   
***, **, * = significant at 1, , and 10 percent levels, respectively.
a. Model II: Trade union density time series extends only from 10 to 00 for Germany.
Notes: Dependent variable: Wage restraint calculated using annual nominal compensation growth and contemporaneous 
GDP per hour growth.Page 
Table 5   Time-series analysis: Italian wage restraint, 1980-2003












unempl –0.01*** 0.00  –0.0** 0.00 –0.010* 0.00
r  0.001 0.00 0.000 0.00 –0.00 0.00   0.001 0.00
inflexpect  1.1***  0.1 0.1*** 0.1 –0. 0.1   0.01 0.1
EMU –0.0011 0.0 –0.00 0.01
TUden   0.011 0.01





constant –0.01 0.011 0.1*** 0.0 –0.1 0.   –1. 1.1
Adjusted
    R-squared
0. 0. 0. 0.
n   1 












unempl  –0.01** 0.00  –0.01*** 0.00 –0.01*** 0.00 –0.001 0.00
r  0.000 0.00 –0.000 0.00  –0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00
inflexpect     0.00*** 0.0   0.** 0.1   0.*** 0.1   0. 0.
EMU –0.01  0.0  0.00 0.01 –0.01 0.01 –0.0 0.0
TUden
nongovtempl   1. 1.
trade_eu –0.0 0.   0.1 0.
trade_tot 0.01 0.1   0.0 0.1
spread   0.00** 0.00
structdefchng –0.00 0.01 –0.01 0.01
constant 0.11 0.10   0.1** 0.0   0.1*** 0.0 –1.1 1.
Adjusted
    R-squared
0. 0.1 0. 0.
n    
***, **, * = significant at 1, , and 10 percent, respectively.
a. Model II - Trade Union density time series only extends from 10 to 00 for Italy.
b. Model IV estimated with wage restraint calculated with 1-period lagged GDP per hour  growth, which yields a significant result 
for inflation expectations.








Figure 1   Change in average wage restraint between 1991–98 and 1999–2004 
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Source: OECD and authors’ calculations.Page 1
Figure 2   Credibility proxy: Difference between pre- and post-euro 






















































































































































































Note: Calculated as the difference between long-term government bond yield  averages for 1995m1  
to 1997m12 and 1998m1 to 2000m12 periods.  
 
Source: Data are from IMF's International Financial Statistics.